La Bataille de Bautzen 1813

proved to be the difference in the size of the victory and to make it smaller than it should have been. The tactics used at Lutzen (and later Bautzen) were not nearly as effective as used in 1812 and before. Despite the relative zeal of the troops Napoleon brought to the front, those troops wilted when confronted with real dangers and real opponents. It is interesting to note, that unless Napoleon was present, the likelihood of a French victory fell precipitously during this campaign. Napoleon did not have the same Ney to assist him; and his corps and divisional commanders were not at the same level as they had been in previous campaigns. Thus, Napoleon could only bludgeon his opponents blindly with poor infantry and little cavalry. The artillery seemed to have the least decline of the three arms. Another negative factor Napoleon had to consider was the lower quality of his allied contingents. The various German states not only had been bled white during the Russian campaign, but now questioned why they should even stay with Napoleon. Most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was back under control of Prussia and Russia; and the Italians and Neapolitan, also with heavy losses in Russia, would soon be needed to defend Italy. After Lützow, Prince Eugene would go back to Italy to command the Army of Italy; and King Joachim of Naples would become increasingly erratic and untrustworthy despite being Napoleon’s brother-in-law. The French had several besieged Fortresses with large contingents of French troops and good quality commanders. Of note was Marshal Davout holding out in Hamburg and Count Rapp in Danzig. There were probably close to 100,000 troops in these French outposts in this sprawling region of Germany.

Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessieres, Duc d’Istria

La Bataille de Bautzen 1813

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