La Bataille de Aspern-Essling 1809

Hapsburg Revenge and Recovery Partially inspired by the tumultuous events in Spain, the Austrian war party believed the time was ripe for an Austrian declaration of war in Central Europe and the restoration of Austrian hegemony. Franz’ brother, the Erzherzog Karl, had been a leading advocate of reform in the Austrian army. Karl had been able to increase substantially the size and quality of the Austrian forces. Among the reforms instituted by Karl was the development of the Austrian Masse formations (both divisional and battalion) which would allow the much larger, but relatively cumbersome Austrian formations to defend themselves better against French cavalry. But Erzherzog Karl did not believe his new army was quite ready to take on the French just yet. Thus, Karl was considered part of the

“peace” party, and his respectful opposition to the Hapsburg sabre rattlers would create a dysfunction in Austrian leadership which would plague the Hapsburg direction of the war. The Austrian war party was bolstered by a report from the Austrian finance minister indicating that the Austrians would run out of money by mid-summer 1809 if they remained mobilized. The incentives for war then were high: French problems in Spain; financial reasons to go to war or give up the new army; and the Hapsburg desire for the restoration of its power and reputation. By early February, the Austrians secretly decided to go to war. The Austrian leadership rift would immediately create a problem for the Austrians. Karl wanted the major Austrian offensive thrust to come from Bohemia. Franz and his advisors wished to guard the approaches Vienna by staying south of the Danube. In the end, the Austrians decided on compromise of both plans, and more importantly, had lost a lot of time deciding what to do. Napoleon, on the other hand, not knowing exactly what the Austrians would do, decided to make the Danube Valley his primary field of operations. While Napoleon attended to his imperial duties in Paris and oversaw war preparations at home, he designated Marshal Berthier as the field commander for the newly formed Grand Armee d’Allemagne. This would almost prove disastrous as Berthier, as fine a staff commander as there was, was not a good field commander, and several errors would be made in the upcoming weeks with him at the helm. Compounding the French errors was Napoleon’s miscalculation as to when the Austrians would go on the offensive. It turned out the Austrian attacked nearly a week earlier on April 9, 1809. Berthier was able to build up the French forces from both existing formations in the theatre of operations; new levies from France; and troops from Italy and Illyria so that Napoleon would have a large and effective army ready for his impending arrival. The Austrians opened the war with an invasion of Bavaria across the Inn River. Harsh weather slowed the Austrian advance somewhat, but then Berthier deployed the French army in two insupportable wings separated by more than 75 kilometers. After a rushed trip from Paris, Napoleon took over the Grand Armee at Donauworth on April 17, just in time to rehabilitate Berthier’s haphazard and strung out deployment.

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